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Human-capital accumulation is expected to be the driving engine of economic growth 
and development in the 21
st century. The setting of correct incentives for education 
must therefore rank high on the political agenda. Unfortunately, the economic 
understanding of optimal education policy is still rather limited. A major reason is that 
education is a highly complex process, which is affected both by taxation and by 
potential market failures. This paper focuses on taxation and on the effects it has on 
the most basic trade-offs in education. As a consequence, the model studied is simple. 
Taxpayers have to make a static decision on education, saving, and qualified and 
nonqualified labour. Such a selection of endogenous choices can be justified as 
follows. Education raises the productivity of labour, which makes it necessary to 
differentiate between qualified and nonqualified labour. Education takes time and 
hence causes a cost in the forgone income earned by nonqualified labour. One would 
however not talk of education if forgone earnings were the sole cost of education. The 
use of the term education indicates that there are educators instructing the learners and 
these educators must be paid. This suggests differentiating between the opportunity 
cost of learning and the monetary cost of education.
1 Finally, education has features of 
an investment activity. Its costs are only justified if the return can keep abreast of 
alternative investments. Hence saving must be modelled along with education. 
The model fulfilling such requirements is a straightforward extension of the standard 
two-period life-cycle model, and the analysis of optimal taxation follows Ramsey’s 
tradition. The paper starts by focussing on a representative taxpayer in Sections 2 and 
3. Extensions to heterogeneous taxpayers are derived in Section 4. As a first major 
result it is shown to be second-best efficient to deviate from Ramsey’s Rule and to 
distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour (Proposition 1). No similar result 
is known from the Mirrlees approach to the optimal taxation of education. The result 
holds for arbitrary utility and learning functions. The efficient reduction of 




the General Theory of Second Best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956/57) in mind, one 
might think it efficient to spread tax distortions uniformly across all feasible margins. 
There are, however, particular scenarios where such an inference is unwarranted. As 
others have shown before, there are well-selected utility functions for which it is 
second best not to distort saving and it is equally second best not to distort education if 
the learning function is isoelastic. For the sake of brevity the latter is called the 
Education Efficiency Proposition. First versions have been proved by Bovenberg and 
Jacobs (2005), and Propositions 2 and 3 are variations designed to clarify the 
assumptions needed to prove the Proposition. It is shown that the assumptions made by 
Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) in their latest version for heterogeneous taxpayers can 
be relaxed in the Ramsey framework (Proposition 3). The most critical assumption 
needed to prove the Proposition is that the elasticity of learning must be constant 
across individuals and varying choices of education. This assumption will be defended 
by referring to the cognitive psychology literature, which provides impressive 
empirical evidence in favour of such constancy if only the learning program is kept 
fixed. This phenomenon is known as the Power Law of Learning. The suggested 
policy implication is to ensure undistorted educational choices within particular 
learning programs (intensive margin). Whether and when it is optimal to distort the 
choice between competing learning programs (extensive margin) is a question leading 
beyond the scope of the present study. 
As mentioned, the paper focuses only on the effects taxation has on the basic trade-
offs in education. Such an objective necessitates ignoring various extensions and 
complications, which have been the subject of scrutiny in the literature. Thus 
credibility problems of government policy will be ruled out. The possible time 
inconsistency of education policy is studied by Boadway, Marceau, and Marchand 
(1996) and Andersson and Konrad (2003). The return to education will be considered 
to be certain. Uncertainty is addressed by da Costa and Maestri (2007) and Anderberg 
(2008). Informational asymmetry and availability of nonlinear tax instruments will be 
ruled out. The so-called Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation is followed by 
                                                                                                                                                          
1 The importance of such a differentiation has been stressed before by Trostel (1993, 1996). Nielsen and 
Sörensen fail to make it, and this strongly biases their results. See Section 3 below. Differentiation is however 




Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), Wigger (2004), and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008). 
Finally, in contrast with Trostel (1993, 1996), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), 
Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999), and Richter and Braun (2009), this paper analyses 
taxation in a purely static framework. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of a representative 
taxpayer. Section 3 analyses the structure of second-best efficient policy for the 
representative taxpayer. Section 4 provides extensions to heterogeneous taxpayers. 
Section 5 discusses connections to the literature. Section 6 summarizes. Major proofs 
are relegated to a technical Appendix.  
 
2. A representative-household model 
Consider a representative household living for two periods. Lifetime utility is given by 
1212 (,,,) UCC LL , where  i C  is consumption and  i L  is non-leisure time in period i=1,2. 
Non-leisure time  2 L  is identical with second-period labour supply. By contrast, only a 
time  1 LE −  is spent in the market, while a time E is spent on education. First-period 
labour supply earns a constant wage rate  1 ω ; the productivity of second-period labour 
depends on the amount of education. It is paid  2 () HE ω , where  2 ω  is constant while 
the learning function H(E) displays positive but diminishing returns, H′>0>H′′. It is 
suggestive to interpret  2 L  and  2 HL as qualified labour and effective qualified labour, 
respectively. Likewise, we will use the terms nonqualified labour and nonqualified 
non-leisure for the quantities  1 LE −  and  1 L , respectively. Education has an 
opportunity cost in forgone earnings captured by  1 ω E. This cost of learning adds to 
the (monetary) cost of education, for which college fees may stand. For the sake of 
simplicity the monetary cost is likewise modelled as a linear function of the amount of 
education,  E ϕ . The share of first-period income that is spent neither on education nor 
on consumption is saved: 




By way of normalization, the price of consumption is set equal to one. The gross rate 
of return to saving is denoted by ρ . Second-period consumption is constrained by 
income earned: 
  22 2 () CSH E L ρ ω =+   .        (2) 
All prices are after taxes and subsidies, and the question is which combination of taxes 
and subsidies is constrained efficient. The representative household is assumed to 
maximize utility in  1212 ,, ,, CCLLE  subject to the lifetime budget constraint 
  12 1 12 2 () CC L H E L E ρρ ωω π += + −,      (3) 
stated in second-period units. Interpret  ) ( 1 ϕ ω ρ π + ≡  as the effective (unit) cost of 
education.  
The analysis relies on the dual approach to optimal taxation. This means that the focus 
is shifted from the household’s (indirect) utility function to its (net) expenditure 
function. The task of minimizing (net) expenditures subject to an exogenous utility 
constraint is best solved in a two-step approach. At the first step, income derived from 
education is maximized while keeping  2 L  fixed. Let this income be denoted by 
) , , ( 2 2 L Y π ω   ] ) ( [ max 2 2 E L E H
E π ω − ≡ , and the optimal amount of education by 
) , , ( 2 2 L E π ω . The optimal amount is implicitly defined by the first-order condition 
22 ' HL ωπ = . If the second-period labour supply  2 L  were exogenous, Y would stand 
for pure rent income. However, the focus is here on an endogenous choice of  2 L . 
Hence Y has to be interpreted as quasi-rent income, the source of which is learning and 



























ωω =−  > 0. 
Let the second-period wage rate before taxes be denoted by  2 w , and the effective 
social cost of education (i.e., the effective cost before taxes and subsidies) by 
1 () pr w f =+ . Here r is the gross rate of return to saving before taxes and subsidies, 




is efficient or not distorted if the tax wedge δ  between the marginal social return and 
the effective social cost, 




















−  , 
vanishes. The tax wedge vanishes if, and only if, the rates of return before and after 





=   .             ( 4 )  
The taxpayer’s expenditure function is defined as 
  12 (,,, ; ) eu ωω ρϕ ≡   12 1 1 2 1 2 min[ ( , ( ), )] CC LY L ρρ ωω ρ ω ϕ +− − +  
in   1212 ,, , CCLL   such that   1212 (,,,) UCC LL u ≥ . Assume that the expenditure function 
is twice differentiable. This requires the minimization to be well behaved, which is 
only guaranteed if the concavity of U as a function of  2 L  is so strong that it 
compensates for the convexity of Y in  2 L . (See the example discussed at the end of 
Section 4.) Hence, the assumption of twice differentiability is less innocuous than it 
would be if education were exogenous. 
By relying on a straightforward generalization of the textbook version of Hotelling’s 

















, eϕ  =  E ρ , 
and  eρ  =  11 1 1 () CL E ωω ϕ −+ + =  S − , where subscripts of e indicate partial 
derivatives. The capital letters  i L , S, and  1 C  have to be interpreted as Hicksian supply 
and demand functions. This means that they have to be evaluated at  12 ,, , ωω ρϕ, and u. 
As a result, the choice of education reads  21 2 1 2 (, ( ) ,(,, , ; ) ) EE L u ω ρ ω ϕ ωωρϕ =+  when 
the functional relationships are fully spelled out. 
The government faces the need to raise revenue. Four linear tax instruments are 
available, each of which is distorting. The taxes are levied on period i’s labour income, 
on capital income, and on the monetary cost of education. For the most part of the 




prices before and after tax. This means that the tax on period i’s labour income is 
modelled by  ii w ω − , the tax on capital income by r ρ − , and the tax on the cost of 
education by  f ϕ − . It goes without saying that each tax can well take on a negative 
value so that it is effectively a subsidy. To find out which combination of taxes and 
subsidies is constrained efficient is the purpose of the analysis. Government’s net 
revenue amounts to 
  11 1 () ( ) ( ) Tw L E f E ω ϕ ≡− − + − + 22 2 [( ) ( ) ( ) ]/ wH E L r S r ω ρ −+ − . 
By invoking Hotelling’s lemma it can be written as 
T = 11 1
11
() ( ) we fe ϕ ωϕ
ρρ
−+−+ 22 2 [( ) ( ) ]/ we r e r ρ ω ρ −+ − .   (5) 
 
3. Second-best efficient policy 
The planner’s problem is to maximize net revenue (5) in   12 ,,, x ϕ ωωρ =   subject to 
the individual budget constraint e=0. In the Appendix it is shown that taking partial 
derivatives with respect to  12 ,,, x ϕ ωωρ = , invoking Hotelling’s lemma, and 




























where the total differentiation operator Δ is defined on arbitrary functions 
12 (, ,, ; ) XX u ωω ρϕ =  by 
11 1
1




() f Xϕ ϕ
ρ











According to (7), ΔX equals the weighted sum of the partial derivatives of X with the 
weights given by the tax wedges. It is an approximation of the total change in X when 
taxes are chosen efficiently. If it were efficient not to tax the opportunity cost and the 
monetary cost of education ( 11 , wf ω ϕ == ), then the last term in (6) could be 




S = −[ 11 1 () CL E E ω ϕ −− + ] = − eρ  and 
S Δ  = − eρ Δ  = −[ 111 () CL E E Δω Δ ϕΔ −− + ] +  11 1
1
[( )( ) ( ) ] wL E f E ωϕ
ρ
−− − − . 


























η ,      (8) 
























.    (6′) 
As differentiation is additive, (6′) could equivalently be written in the form where the 













Hence the quantities  1 C ,  2 C ,  1 L , E,  1 LE − , and  2 HL  should be reduced in the same 
proportion from their pre-tax values, whereas  2 L  should be reduced to a lesser degree, 
when all these demand and supply functions are interpreted in the Hicksian sense. The 
equiproportionate reduction is something one would clearly expect in view of 
Ramsey’s (1927) characterization of efficient taxation. The striking result concerns 
2 L . Obviously, efficiency requires reducing qualified labour relatively less than non-
qualified labour. The ratio equals 1−η, and it decreases in η. In other words, the 
more elastic the individual learning function is, the less should qualified labour be 
reduced in relative terms. Although this makes good sense, one must note that it fails 
to agree with Ramsey’s Rule of reducing all household choices equiproportionately. 
Only the effective labour  2 HL  is reduced equiproportionately. As H=H(E) reacts 





Proposition 1: Second-best efficient policy requires reducing  
(i)    education, consumption, nonqualified non-leisure and labour, and 
effective qualified labour equiproportionately while reducing   














  .         ( 9 )  
 
Proposition 1 raises the question as to which choices of  12 ,, ϕ ωω, and ρ  (and the 
associated tax rates) are second best. Clearly, one cannot expect any interesting 
relationship to hold in full generality. Instead, one has to assume special functions U or 
H. By varying these assumptions different characterizations of second-best tax rates 
are obtained. Some of these are more novel than others as compared with standard 
Ramsey tax results. An example of little novelty concerns saving. As shown by 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and Sandmo (1974), saving should not be taxed if utility 
is weakly separable in consumption and labour and homothetic in consumption. This 
result extends to the present framework if U is specified as  12 12 ((, ) ,, ) UGCC LL  with 
some homogeneous function G. See the earlier draft of this paper (Richter, 2008). In 
what follows the focus is on characterizations of second-best tax rates that contrast 
with standard Ramsey results. Two such characterizations are derived. The first one is 
on education, and the second one is on labour. 
On applying the differentiation operator Δ to the first-order condition associated with 








ΔΔ Δ π ω
πω
+=  
  =     11 22 1
2
11





ω ϕ ωω ϕ
πω
−
−+ − − − + + 






− .         ( 1 0 )  





























−   .    (11) 
Obviously, the right-hand side must vanish if  ' η =0. 
 
Proposition 2: If, and only if the individual learning function is isoelastic, it is efficient 
not to distort the choice of education. 
 
Proposition 2 is only the first version of the Education Efficiency Proposition derived 
in this paper. An intuitive explanation is the following. Second-best efficient policy 
needs to be sustained by private maximization behaviour. This is however ensured 
only if condition (10) holds. If the right-hand side of (10) does not vanish, a 
discrepancy results between maximizing private and social ability rents,  22 HL E ωπ −  
and  22 wH L p E − . This is so because the last term on the right-hand side of the 
following identity does not vanish: 














Hence maximizing efficiency does not require maximizing the social ability rent. In 
this case, the planner trades off the objective of maximizing the social ability rent 
against the objective of minimizing the efficiency loss resulting from distorted choices 
of the utility-generating quantities  1 C ,  2 C ,  1 L , and  2 L . These two objectives are only 
separable if (4) holds, i.e. if the right-hand side of (10) vanishes. Compatibility of (10) 
with (6′) however requires that (4) holds if, only if the elasticity of the individual 
learning function is constant. 
If some positive tax revenue is to be generated, second-best efficient policy calls for 
reducing education,  E Δ <0. Condition (11) then implies  ' η >0 if, and only if 
22 // wp ωπ < 22 // wpωπ ⇔<. Hence, education should be effectively subsidized if, 





Remark 2: If, and only if the elasticity of the individual learning function is strictly 
increasing at the second-best level of education, should education be 
effectively subsidized. 
 
Combining Propositions 1 and 2 implies that efficient policy well tolerates a reduction 
in education. This reduction cannot be interpreted, however, as a (conditional) 
distortion of education. This observation allows one to qualify Trostel (1993), who 
stresses the negative effect of proportional income and consumption taxation on 
education. To make the point clear, consider some proportional tax on labour income 
and allow monetary costs of education to be tax-deductible. In this case  2 w  is reduced 
in the same proportion as p. As a result, all individual choices of  1 C ,  2 C ,  1 L , and  2 L  
will be distorted. Still, the partial efficiency condition (4) holds by construction. 
To illustrate the effect of endogenous education on efficient labour taxation, consider 
the scenario given by 
HE
η = ,     12 1 1 22 (, ) () () UG C C V L V L =− − ,    
"' / ii i i LV V ν ≡  (i=1,2), (12) 
and linear homogeneous G. As mentioned before, the taxpayer’s optimization is only 
well behaved if the concavity of U as a function of  2 L  is strong enough to compensate 
for the convexity of the ability rent Y in  2 L . In terms of (12) this means that 
2 ν > /(1 ) η η −  has to hold by assumption. Define taxes  i τ  in exclusive form by setting 
22 2 (1 ) w τω ≡+  and  11 1 (1 ) w τω ≡+ . In the Appendix it is shown that wage taxes are 
second best if they satisfy the condition 
  22
11
(1 ) τη ν η
τν
−−
= .          ( 1 3 )  
As  2 ν > /(1 ) η η −  is to hold by assumption, the numerator on the right-hand side of (13) 
is positive. For  0 η = , (13) is the familiar Inverse Elasticity Rule. According to this 
rule, wage taxes  i τ  should be set inversely proportional to the wage elasticities of 




education. The effect of education is to reduce  2 τ  relative to  1 τ . Just note that 
2 (1 ) η νη −− < 2 ν . 
 
4. Extensions 
Propositions 1 and 2 are clear-cut results, and it is natural to ask whether they continue 
to hold in more general settings. Two extensions are of particular interest. One allows 
for endogeneity of factor prices, and the other allows for heterogeneity of taxpayers. 
As the former extension implies no surprising result, it will only be sketched. 
The claim is that Propositions 1 and 2 go through when prices are endogenous. In fact, 
it has been shown in the earlier draft of this paper (Richter, 2008) that Propositions 1 
and 2 continue to hold if the second-period factor prices r and  2 w  are endogenous. 
Two assumptions must however hold. The first one states that the government must be 
able to issue debt B, so that only the excess of savings over public debt, K=S−B, is a 
factor of production. The second assumption requires constant returns to scale of 
production in effective qualified labour  2 HL  and capital K. Such constant returns make 
the Diamond–Mirrlees (1971) Production Efficiency Theorem applicable, and it is 
second best not to distort production but only consumption. 
A more interesting extension concerns heterogeneity of taxpayers. As will be shown 
next, the Education Efficiency Proposition holds even if the planner trades off 
efficiency against equity and even if the set of policy instruments is incomplete. 
However, it must be assumed that the right policy instruments are available and that 
the elasticity of learning is constant, both in the level of education and across 
individuals. To be more precise, let  1,.., nN =  be the parameter identifying a particular 
taxpayer. Taxpayers are assumed to differ in preferences and the productivity of 
learning, but not in the elasticity of learning. Hence  1212 (,,,)
n
n uU C C L L =  and 
()
n
n HE h E
η = . Let  n E ,  2n L , etc. be the choices made by n, and let 
n T  denote the taxes 
paid by n on labour income, savings, and the cost of education as specified by (5). In 
order to model redistribution, assume that n receives some exogenous income  n g  




Hence ϕ  and  2 ω  belong to the set of available policy instruments. The planner then 
maximizes net aggregate tax revenue subject to the constraints that individual budgets 
are balanced and that welfare W remains constant: 




Tg r −    in   2 ,, n u ϕ ω   subject to          (14) 
n g = 12 (,,, ;) n eu ωω ρϕ    ,  ( n λ )     (15) 
 and  1 (, . . , ) N Wu u   =  constant.       (16) 
n λ  denotes a Lagrange variable. In the Appendix the following result is derived. 
 
Proposition 3: Assuming heterogeneous taxpayers but constancy of the learning 
elasticity η  in  , nE, and assuming availability of  2 , ϕ ω , it is optimal not to 
distort education. 
 
Proposition 3 generalizes a version of the Education Efficiency Proposition for 
heterogeneous taxpayers that has been derived before by Jacobs and Bovenberg 
(2008). The generalization lies in showing that two assumptions on which the analysis 
of Jacobs and Bovenberg is based can be dropped. One is the availability of a poll tax, 
and the other is the assumption of identical utility functions. 
The assumption that both ϕ  and  2 ω  are available policy instruments is noteworthy in 
that it implies that ϕ  cannot simply be substituted by  1 ω  without affecting efficiency. 
This means that it is not irrelevant in the Ramsey framework which kind of 
educational cost is taxed or subsidized. Subsidizing the monetary cost of education is 
not equivalent to subsidizing the opportunity cost of forgone earnings, as shown in 
more detail in the earlier draft of the present paper (Richter, 2008). A subsidy to the 
monetary cost of education targets the choice of education without directly affecting 
utility. This is different with  1 ω . A subsidy to the cost of forgone earnings affects both 
the choice of education and the choice of non-qualified leisure. The lack of 




results that have been derived in models not allowing one to differentiate between the 
two costs of education. A case in point is Nielsen and Sörensen (1997), who analyse 
the merits of dual income taxation. Their main and much-cited result states that labour 
income should optimally be taxed progressively ( 22 /w ω < 11 /w ω ) if the qualified 
labour supply is not too elastic and cross substitution of complementarity effects is not 
too strong. The present analysis suggests that this result should be interpreted with 
great caution because it relies on an analysis not modelling the monetary cost of 
education. It is as if ϕ  would not be an available instrument, and the proven efficiency 
of progressive labour taxation can be attributed at most third-best status. 
The constancy of the learning elasticity η  in  , nE is critical for Proposition 3 to hold, 
and it needs to be commented on. Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) find such constancy 
restrictive and presumably too restrictive to serve as the basis of policy 
recommendations. However, constancy can well be defended by referring to the Power 
Law of Learning known from cognitive psychology. The content of this law is the 
following. According to common experience, most tasks get faster with practice, and 
this holds across task size and task type. If the relationship between practice and the 
completion time of a task is plotted, a power law is generally seen to provide the best 
fit. The elasticity of completion is not only a constant function of practice; it also 
seems to be fairly constant across individuals. In any case, individual learning 
functions seem to differ less in their elasticity than in their level (Anderson, 2005 
(1980), Chap. 6; Crossman, 1959). If practice is denoted by E and the inverse 
completion time of subject n by 
n H , this evidence suggests specifying  ()
n HE  as 
n hE
η. The only drawback is that elasticities can differ strongly between different 
learning programs. This suggests relying on the Power Law of Learning if the focus is 
on a particular learning program and rejecting it else. The policy implication would be 
to ensure that educational choices are at least not distorted within particular learning 
programs (intensive margin). Whether and when it is optimal to distort the choice 
between competing learning programs (extensive margin) cannot be answered by the 




According to Ritter et al. (2001) “the power law of practice is ubiquitous”. Still, little 
reference to it can be found in the economics literature. A well-known exception is 
Arrow (1962). However, in Arrow’s model the learning function takes the role of a 
labour demand curve. Knowledge is completely embodied in capital, and at each 
moment of time capital goods of different vintages are in use. As Arrow stresses 
himself in his closing comments, the implicit assumption is that learning takes place 
only as a by-product of ordinary production. By way of contrast, learning is central in 
the present model. It is an individual investment in one’s own productivity and the 
result of endogenous choice. 
If many taxpayers are involved, Ramsey’s result of equiproportionate reductions in 
demands and supplies is known to only hold with some qualification. The reductions 
have to be differentiated in accordance with equity concerns. This has been shown by 
Diamond and Mirrlees, and a textbook version can be found in Myles (1995). Second-
best efficient reductions in aggregate compensated demands are the smaller the more 
the goods are consumed by taxpayers whose marginal utility of income is highly 
valued in social terms. This result carries over to the present context but only for first-
period consumption, nonqualified non-leisure and labour, education, and effective 
qualified labour. For a proof see the Appendix. 
 















     ( 1 7 )  
for    11 1 2 ,, ,, XC L LE E H L =− . 
 
The left-hand side of (17) has to be interpreted as a proportional reduction in aggregate 
compensated demand or supply of X. The right-hand side determines the size of the 
reduction. The reduction would be the same for all X if the social marginal utility of 




for reasons of equity, the demands and supplies of taxpayers with high values of  n λ  
are more highly weighted than the demands of other taxpayers, and the reduction of X 
is adapted accordingly. 
Statement (ii) of Proposition 1 extends to heterogeneous taxpayers, with two 
qualifications. The first one is that the change in aggregate qualified labour is 
compared with the change in aggregate education. Assuming the latter change to be 
negative ( n E  <0), (18) holds as stated with “>”. The interpretation is that aggregate 
qualified labour is reduced less than the extended Ramsey rule (17) suggests. The 
second qualification is that productivity 
n H  enters as a weighting scheme. More 
precisely, assuming  n E  <0, it is shown in the Appendix that the weighted 





















.       ( 1 8 )  
 
5. The Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation of education 
There have been attempts by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and by Wigger (2004) to 
characterize optimal incentives for education when adopting the modelling tradition of 
Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). The specific feature of this approach 
is the assumption of asymmetric information. In terms of the present notation it is as if 
the qualified wage rate  2() wn  and the qualified labour supply  2n L  are private and not 
public information. The planner can only verify the product of the two. In a model 
with education the question arises whether and to what extent the amount of education 
should be verifiable. Bovenberg and Jacobs study the scenario when  n E  is verifiable as 
well as the scenario when  n E  is imperfectly verifiable. The following discussion 
assumes that all individual choices  121 ,, , nn n n CCLE , except that of the qualified labour 
supply, are verifiable. Full verifiability of  n E  convinces to the extent that education 
can be measured by the years spent in institutions of education. Jacobs and Bovenberg 




(i) The planner must be able to levy a nonlinear tax T on qualified labour income and 
also to subsidize costs of education by some nonlinear scheme S. (ii) Utility 
functions must be weakly separable in qualified labour and all other individual choice 
variables. In the present notation this means  121 2 (( , , ) , ) UU V C C LL = . (iii) Qualified 
labour income before tax, 2 Z , must be weakly separable in n and  2 L , on the one hand, 
and in education E, on the other hand, so that  2 Z  can be written as  2 Z ( 22 (, ) wn L,E). 
Given this set of assumptions, it is optimal to equalize marginal rates of taxation and 
subsidization: T   = S . As a result, not only education is undistorted, but also saving 
and nonqualified labour supply. The most direct way of implementing such an optimal 
tax-transfer system would be the following: (i) Only qualified labour income is taxed. 
(ii) Taxpayers are allowed to carry forward costs of education and learning and to 
deduct them against qualified labour income  2 Z . Notice that not only monetary costs 
of education should be tax-deductible, but also costs of forgone earnings. See also 
Trostel (1996, 1993), who argues in favour of deductions even exceeding 100%. 
da Costa and Maestri (2007) and Anderberg (2008) extend the analysis of optimal 
education policy by incorporating uncertainty. Anderberg sets up a model in which 
qualified labour income can be written in multiplicative form,  2 Z = 22 2 (, ) wn EL , and in 
which n takes the role of a productivity shock hitting the representative taxpayer. He 
demonstrates that education should not be distorted if the elasticity of  2 Z  with respect 
to  E is constant in n. The simplest specification ensuring such constancy is 
multiplicative:  2 Z = 22 () () wn H E L . 
It may be of interest to note that the Education Efficiency Proposition can be derived 
in both frameworks of Ramsey and Mirrlees but that the required assumptions differ 
strongly. In particular, constant elasticity of earnings with respect to education is only 
needed in the Ramsey setting. The explanation is as follows. In the Ramsey approach 
the planner has two independent efficiency objectives. One is the minimization of 
distortions in the quantities from which utility is derived. The other objective is the 
maximization of the quasi-rent income generated by education. These two 
optimizations are separable, given the linearity constraint on policy instruments, only 




efficient not to distort education and to minimize the distortions in consumption and 
labour choices. In the cited papers standing in the Mirrlees tradition the planner has 
only one objective to pursue. This objective is to keep highly productive taxpayers 
from mimicking less productive taxpayers. For this purpose it suffices to tax qualified 
labour, as this is the only choice variable for which private information is assumed. As 
all other individual choices are observable and weakly separable from qualified labour, 
they should remain undistorted. Conditional efficiency of education can be sustained 
because the functional specification of subsidization is a priori not constrained and the 
marginal subsidy to education can therefore be set equal to the marginal tax on 
qualified labour income. 
 
6. Summary 
Economists are only beginning to understand the optimal setting of tax incentives for 
education. A major breakthrough is by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). The present 
paper contributes to the literature by analysing efficient taxation of education in 
Ramsey’s tradition. It does so by relying on the standard two-period life-cycle model 
of a representative household with endogenous consumption, labour, and education. A 
first notable result (Proposition 1) states that Ramsey’s Rule does apply to education, 
consumption, and nonqualified labour but not to qualified labour. Qualified labour 
supply should be reduced less than the other demands and supplies in relative terms. 
No particularly selected utility functions are needed to derive this result. The 
modelling strategy, however, seems to be critical. At least no similar result has been 
derived before within the Mirrlees framework of asymmetric information. 
The drawback of the Ramsey approach is that efficient reductions of demands and 
supplies cannot be translated one to one into efficient tax rates. Statements about 
efficient tax rates are only possible if specific assumptions are made. A well-known 
example is the familiar Inverse Elasticity Rule. In Section 3 it is shown how this rule 
has to be adapted if applied to qualified and nonqualified labour. Another example is 
the result by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and others that saving should not be 
distorted if utility is separable in consumption and labour and homothetic in 




education. While it depends on the utility function whether saving should be taxed or 
not, the efficiency of not distorting education only depends on the learning function. 
More precisely, it is shown to be efficient not to distort education if the learning 
function is isoelastic (Proposition 2). This result is called the Education Efficiency 
Proposition, and Section 4 offers an extension to many heterogeneous taxpayers. 
Proposition 3 generalizes earlier versions of the Education Efficiency Proposition 
derived by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) by 
adopting the Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation. Two sets of assumptions must 
hold to prove the present version: (i) It must be possible to tax qualified labour and to 
tax/subsidize the monetary cost of education. (ii) The learning function must be 
isoelastic, and the elasticity must be constant across individuals. Implicit is the 
assumption that education is weakly separable from labour and ability in earning 
income. 
It is natural to ask whether and to what extent the Education Efficiency Proposition 
can offer guidance in education policy. Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) express 
scepticism. They do so by questioning the empirical relevance of weak separability of 
education from labour and ability in earning income, and even more the relevance of 
constant elasticity of education. In Section 4 a more positive view is suggested. It is 
argued that cognitive psychology provides impressive evidence for learning functions 
the elasticity of which does not vary either in the amount of learning or between 
individuals. Applicability of this Power Law of Learning is only limited by the 
observation that the elasticities can differ strongly between different learning 
programs. The policy conclusion would be that educational choices should at least not 
be distorted at the intensive margin. Things may be very different at the extensive 
margin, and not only for the reason that education fails to be weakly separable from 
labour and ability in earning income or that the planner trades off efficiency against 
equity. Dynamic complementarities may provide another strong reason to distort 
educational choices systematically. This point is elaborated by Richter and Braun 
(2009). By working with an overlapping-generations model with endogenous growth, 
they show that it may well be second-best efficient to subsidize education relative to 




the planner’s sole objective. The reason for systematic subsidization is a human-capital 
investment function displaying a strictly increasing elasticity of education. It is argued 
that in a dynamic framework such increasing elasticity may be a more appealing 
assumption than constant elasticity. In view of Remark 2 above it is not surprising to 
learn that subsidizing human-capital investment is then efficiency enhancing. 
 
9. Appendix 
The proof of (6) relies on taking partial derivatives of the Lagrange function Te λ −  
with respect to  1 ,, ϕρω , and  2 ω : 
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By Hotelling’s lemma and by the definition of the Δ-operator, one obtains 
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Plugging (20) into (19) yields  1/ / rE E λΔ −= . Similarly one derives  
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By relying on the definition of the expenditure function and by invoking Hotelling’s 
lemma one obtains 
  12 x x CC ρ +  =  11 2 2 x x LH L ρωω +      for   12 ,, , x ωωρϕ = .  (21) 
The relationship (21) extends to the Δ-notation: 
  12 CC ρΔΔ +  =  11 2 2 LH L ρωΔ ω Δ +   .       ( 2 2 )  
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Proof  of  (13): As  12 (, ) GC C  is linear homogeneous, it is efficient to set  r ρ = . 
Optimizing utility in consumption yields  12 (, ) GC C = 22 (() , ) GcrC C = 2 (, 1 ) Gc C and 
12 rC C + = 2 [1 ] rc C + . Set  (, 1 ) / Gc [1 ] rc+≡ g. Optimizing utility in  1 L  yields 
'
11 Vr g ω = . 



























−= − . 
The determination of  22 / LL Δ  is a bit more involved. The first-order condition of the 
taxpayer’s optimal choice of  2 L  is 
'
22 2 Vg H g E
η ωω ==. Applying the Δ-operator and 













































The Proof of Proposition 3 generalizes that of (6). The first-order condition of the 
planner’s maximization with respect to ϕ  is obtained along the lines indicated by (19) 
and (20): 
  0  =  ρ
1
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The derivation with respect to  2 ω  yields 
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Proof of Proposition 4: For X=E the statement (17) follows from dividing (23) through 
by  n E  . For  12 , XLE H L =−  one first has to take partial derivatives of the Lagrange 








Δλ =−  .         ( 2 5 )  
Dividing through by  n X   yields (17) for  1 XLE =− and  2 HL . The case of  1 XL =  
follows from the linearity of (25) in X. Taking the partial derivative of the Lagrange 
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λω ϕ −−− −  . 
Making use of (25) for  1 XLE =−, E yields (25) for  1 XC =  from which (17) follows. 
It is noted without proof that (25) and (17) hold for  2 XC =  only if exogenous income 
n g =0 for all n. 
As to the inequality (18), assume  n
n
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HL Δ  . 
Dividing through by  2
n
n HL   yields (18).  
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